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Abstract  
This research case study examines the creation and development of a bottom-up social 
enterprise immediately after the outbreak of a civil war in an Arab country by a group of young 
patriots in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings in the 2010s. Drawing on Linders’ (2012) 
model of social action lifecycle, our study examines how different actors become involved and 
co-created a socially entrepreneurial venture (SEV), how these actors contributed to the co-
production and co-delivery of the social actions (values) over time, and how social media play 
roles in these processes. Drawing from the empirical evidences of citizen co-production within 
the existing literature, we found that SEVs operate in very different ways in which the role of 
social media is critical, both from their equivalents operating in a penurious but stable 
environment, and those intending to pursue political action within a conflict situation. In our 
case study, social media was not intended for mass-mobilisation, but for selected mobilisation 
amongst those within the network. This is due to the insecure environment and the fear of 
infiltration from opposing parties. We also examine how new actors were, over time, being 
carefully screened and selected, and potential harmful existing players being excluded, which 
in turn contributed to the evolving nature of the social enterprises.   
Keywords: Interaction, collaboration, uncertainty, war and conflict, social entrepreneurship, 
youth  
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1 Introduction  
With over 125 violent conflicts recorded worldwide since the end of the Cold War, killing an 
estimate of seven million people (Banfield et al, 2006), the understanding of the specific focus 
on the conflict context is empirically crucial. Conflict situations often bring about the 
destruction of buildings, infrastructure and communication networks, but most importantly of 
all, people, families and communities. Repairing this damage often requires swift collective, 
socially entrepreneurial actions. Existing research has examined the behaviours of ‘volunteer 
citizens’ at a time of emergency (Wenger, 1991), suggesting that it is often those who feel 
physically, culturally or cognitively close to those being affected by the emergency situation 
are most likely to want to get involved, to help out or contribute in any way they can to the 
relief and subsequent rebuilding process (Lowe and Fothergill, 2003). Self-organised initiatives 
by these compassionate ‘volunteer citizens’ include the formation of socially entrepreneurial 
ventures (SEVs) (Miller, Grimes, McMullen and Vogus, 2012), which can be loosely defined 
as innovative, social value-creating entrepreneurial activities addressing ‘unsolvable’ social 
problems particularly focusing on neglected social issues amongst groups that are marginalised 
within mainstream societies (Bornstein, 2007; De Clerq and Honig, 2011; Lewis, 2013). Such 
entities can bring relief and supports, and are increasingly being seen to have a key role to play 
in the rebuilding process in emerging situations such as those arising in the aftermath of natural 
disasters (Lewis, 2013).  
Scholars have highlighted the important roles of social media in the co-creation of such entities 
for the co-production of political (Rainie et al., 2012) and social actions (Bertot, Jaeger and 
Grimes, 2010; Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012; Segerberg and Bennett, 2011) in a stable 
environment. Scholars have also highlighted the roles of social media for the co-creation of 
political movements and co-production of political actions in a resource-poor and unstable 
environment (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013; Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer, 
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2013). However, despite such important roles of social media in the co-creation of SEVs for 
addressing complex social issues in penurious environments and complex political issues in 
resource-poor and unstable environments, scholars have still overlooked the importance of the 
study of how social media play roles for the co-creation of SEVs and co-production of social 
actions (values) in a resource-poor and unstable environment such as war and conflict zones. 
Scholars have long considered that entrepreneurship is a context dependent social process 
(Ireland et al., 2003; Low and Abrahamson,1997). Thus, entrepreneurship is different in the 
context of war and conflicts than it is in the context of stable environment (Cheung and Kwong, 
2017). Similarly, social entrepreneurship could be different in different contexts. Hence, it is 
crucial to study social entrepreneurship in the context of war and conflicts. Drawing on 
Linders’ (2012) model of social action lifecycle, our study will answer the following research 
questions. 
a How do different actors become involved and co-create a socially entrepreneurial 
venture (SEV) in a resource-poor and unstable environment? And what roles do social 
media play in this process? 
b How do the different actors of SEVs contribute to the co-production and co-delivery of 
the social actions (values) over time in a resource-poor and unstable environment? And 
what roles do social media play in this process? 
We aim to answer these questions by an in-depth case study (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) of an 
SEV operating in a war and conflict zone and by considering social media as a particular 
channel by which actors communicate for the co-creation of SEVs and co-production of 
socially entrepreneurial actions. ‘Social media’ refers to “a set of online tools that are designed 
for and centred around social interaction” [(Bertot, Jaeger and Hansen, (2012), p. 30], and it 
includes social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace and Twitter (Bertot, Jaeger and 
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Hansen, 2012; Kaplan and Haenlein 2010; O'Keeffe and Clarke-Pearson, 2011). ‘Co-creation’ 
simply refers in this study to the creation of SEVs by the affected people and for the affected 
people in the penurious environment. Similarly, ‘co-production’ refers to the production of 
social action (values) by the affected people and for the affected people in the penurious 
environment. 
We argue that our research focus is original for two reasons. Firstly, previous studies 
tend to assume that the war and conflict environment is only one variant of the penurious 
environment, with the majority of studies on social media focusing on the generation of citizen-
to-citizen (C2C) socially entrepreneurial actions amongst resource-poor, but stable contexts. 
Furthermore, prior literature has focused on the creation of socially entrepreneurial ventures 
mostly in the context of a resource-poor but stable environment (developed countries) (e.g. 
Corner and Ho 2010; Di Domenico, Haugh and Tracey, 2010). We, on the other hand, 
acknowledge some major similarities between the resource-poor and unstable environment 
(war and conflicts) and the resource-poor but stable environment, but also identify considerable 
differences between them for the creation and operation of ventures (Anderson, Markides and 
Kupp, 2010). Secondly, although studies have looked into the use of social media and the 
mobilisation of protestors for political actions, very few have focused on how it mobilises 
collective social rather than political actions. The existing studies on the mobilisation of 
political actions tend to acknowledge that the use of social media is often limited to the 
dissemination of information and the airing of discontent through online outlets, rather than for 
physical collective action (He and Warren, 2011; Morozov, 2011). We argue that user-led 
participation in social media does often go beyond the dissemination of information or the 
airing of discontent, but there are more dynamic mechanisms for the co-creation and co-
delivery of change.  
In this study, we explore how and when different actors are mobilised through social 
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media and, in the process, co-create a new SEV intending to offer social action to those in need. 
We then further examine the co-delivery process and in particular, the logistical 
communication for socially entrepreneurial actions. We also explore how, over time, the 
network within the social media communication chain evolves, and, when combined with 
change in an external context, results in further evolution of the nature of the SEV in the longer 
run.   
We found that social media forms a key role in the co-creation of the SEV and co-
production of socially entrepreneurial actions. Unlike in previous studies where social media 
is often limited to an information dissemination role, we also found that it plays a key role in 
the actual organisation of the SEV and in particular, the logistics of communication among 
different actors within the chain.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next two sections discuss the 
existing literature on the role of social media in the co-creation and co-delivery of social 
actions, before focusing specifically on a conflict situation. We then proceed to discuss 
methodology, before presenting the results, then finally, the conclusion. 
2 Social Media and the co-creation of SEVs and co-production and co-delivery of 
collective social entrepreneurial actions  
The entrepreneurship literature has moved away from its initial emphasis on a personal, solitary 
entrepreneurship journey, and towards a network view, placing an increasing emphasis on 
social embeddedness whereby different actors are brought together through the sharing of 
certain meanings and understandings (Downing, 2005; Granovetter, 2000; Jack and Anderson, 
2002; Jack et al., 2008). Scholars have linked social embeddedness to opportunity creation 
(Jack and Anderson, 2002), access to financial resources (Uzzi, B., 1999), application of new 
venture ideas (Simsek, Lubatkin and Floyd, 2003), and nature of entrepreneurship and the 
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behaviours of entrepreneurs (Welter and Smallbone, 2011). Thus, the social contexts can 
influence social innovation and social entrepreneurship (Newth and Woods, 2014). Moreover, 
Di Domenico, Haugh and Tracey [(2010), p. 690)] acknowledge the important roles of society 
and community in the creation of socially entrepreneurial ventures. 
Increasingly, studies have also explored how social media can generate collective C2C 
actions (Guo and Saxton, 2014; Obar, Zube and Lampe, C., 2012; Segerberg and Bennett, 
2011), and how it is crucial for the formation and development of SEVs (Korsgaard and 
Anderson, 2011; Lewis, 2013). Facilitated by improvements and the increasingly widespread 
availability of information and communication technologies, social media form an increasingly 
popular platform where individuals sharing similar causes can interact and communicate in a 
“polychronic way” [(Lee and Liebenau, (2002), p. 132], thereby promoting collaboration 
between them (Cameron and Webster, 2005; Yamamoto, 2006). Such an open platform 
facilitates the exchange of information, expands participation in discussion forums to those 
with more diverse backgrounds and who are more geographically dispersed, and allows 
different individuals to contribute in their own way (Amichai-Hamburger, 2008; Linders, 
2012). Wikipedia, for instance, is often viewed as one such example where individuals develop 
a distributed peer production network that requires minimal financial input. Crowdsourcing is 
another means where users are gathered by an online platform to co-create a specific project or 
product, an example of which could be Gooseberry Path, which utilised its community to create 
a series of cookbooks. By allowing discussion and feedback, social media can also promote 
group identity construction, which is an antecedent for action (Valenuela, 2013).  
For co-production of socially entrepreneurial action to succeed in the long term, the 
ability to sustain a social initiative beyond the initial generation of interest is crucial. Beyond 
information dissemination, Linders’ (2012) model of social action lifecycle categorises the co-
creation and co-production process into three sequential stages: i) design and planning, ii) 
7 
 
delivery and execution, and iii) monitoring and evaluation, which are elaborated further in 
Table 1.     
*** Insert Table 1 about here*** 
3. The context of paucity, war and conflict, and the role of social media under such 
conditions   
Conventionally, conflict is categorised as a form of penurious environment (Gelditsch et al., 
2006), which conveniently is also the contextual bracket within which social entrepreneurships 
are traditionally being placed (Le Billion, 2001). ‘Social entrepreneurship’ describes the 
activities of grass–roots activists and others, which address social issues in innovative and 
creative ways (Nicholls, 2008). Similarly, Chell (2007, p.11) states that social entrepreneurship 
is underpinned by ‘pro-social motives that drive the primary mission’. Hence, the SEV that 
focuses less on profits or financial returns and more on both the innovation and sustainability 
is a social enterprise (Chell 2007; Lewis, 2013). Within such a bracket of paucity where 
resources are severely constrained, SEVs are being hailed for their ability to offer novel 
products, services and supports to communities and markets that have been previously 
neglected by the free market due to limited financial returns (Leadbeater, 1997; Thompson, 
2002). Such an ability is often attributed to superior localised, tacit knowledge that helped 
reducing uncertainties and costs (Santos, 2012). It indicates a clear shift of thinking towards 
bottom-up initiatives (O’Reilly, 2010).  
Literature on C2C co-production has generally pointed to the difficulty for individuals 
to effectively co-ordinate and self-organise C2C social actions and in particular, the difficulties 
in managing a multifaceted and vast interaction chain between different actors (Osbourne, 
2010). Many C2C social actions such as Neighbourhood Watch would not survive without 
governmental supports. Therefore, government supported social media platform is often seen 
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as crucial for C2C SEVs to prosper (Linders, 2012). Such supports include the Government 2.0 
taskforce in Australia, the ‘Government-with you’ model in Singapore, or the Open 
Government Directive in the US, where the government often offers a platform for citizens to 
use co-governance through providing resources, setting rules, and mediating disputes, but 
leaving room for citizens and other non-profit organisations to do the heavy-lifting (Linders, 
2011).  
 Nevertheless, the literature in the context of conflict environments receives little 
attention (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013). Conflict situations present a triple whammy of challenges 
that are unique and different from other forms of penurious environment. First of all, the 
resultant destruction from conflicts attributed to the intensification of social problems and the 
number of people in need of immediate support (Pennebaker and Harber, 1993; Summerfiel, 
1998). Secondly, war and conflict created a situation where the distribution of power and 
responsibility has shifted drastically away from the state (Rummel, 1977; Singer, 2003). 
Thirdly, international relief agencies may struggle to enter conflict environments to offer 
supports (Duffield, 1997).    
Studies have found that social media can play a major role in contributing to collective 
actions at a time of conflict. For instance, tech-savvy protestors used social media to let their 
voices be heard during the Arab Spring (Bruns et al., 2013; Gladwell and Shirky, 2011; Shirky, 
2011). However, it has often been noted that the use of social media has not been able to provide 
strategic, interactive, organisational communication or act as a stakeholder engagement tool 
amongst organisations intending to mobilise political actions (Saxton et al., 2007), but merely 
gives users a false sense of participation (‘slacktivists’) that had minimal effect on social 
outcome (He and Warren, 2011; Morozov, 2009).  
*** Insert Table 2 about here*** 
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Literature on political activism suggests that conflict situations present enormous 
challenges for the organisers of political actions to obtain the type of information that is 
necessary for the effective mobilisation of social action. Lemert (1981) argued that mobilising 
actors requires three types of information, which are summarised in Table 2. Studies have 
found that challenges in obtaining information via social media have restricted it to information 
dissemination and the airing of discontent, while the organisation of the actual logistics of 
managing political actions and protests remains largely off-line (Lotan et al., 2011). We explore 
in this study how SEVs access and manage the identification, locational and tactical 
information about actors and themselves for co-producing social actions in war and conflict 
zones where confidentiality of this information is crucial. Furthermore, studies found notable 
differences between the different forms of social media, with the particular focus on inclusivity 
versus exclusivity. The benefits and drawbacks of the respective forms are highlighted in Table 
3. From the discussion in this section, we also come up with a graphical representation of our 
conceptual framework (Figure 1).  
*** Insert Table 3 about here*** 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here*** 
4 The research context 
The research context of this study concerns the uprisings which occurred in one Arab country 
that was affected by the Arab Spring. To protect the respondents’ identities we apply the 
pseudonym  ‘Zaman’ throughout. The context is a typical one during the Arab Spring: citizens 
opposed to a long-serving autocratic regime, initially leading to a short series of mass anti-
government protests that were quickly suppressed by the military. Such protests quickly 
transformed into a number of opposition bodies forming rebel groups, who armed themselves 
through various means. This eventually led to a full-scale civil war resulting in a significant 
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period of bloodshed. The conflict has resulted in considerable instability within the whole 
country, with the country becoming segmented and falling into the control of different militia 
groups. One notable consequence is that the collapse of the national economic system and the 
destruction of physical, transport and communication infrastructures by warfare have 
considerably affected the livelihood of the majority of people within the country, with the most 
severely affected being those who lived within some of the key strategic cities where battles 
are constantly being fought between different parties.  
The context of conflict presents a number of social challenges in relation to this 
research. Firstly, many people wanted to get out of the dangerous situation that they faced 
within the conflict zone. A considerable proportion of houses, physical infrastructures and 
communication channels have been destroyed and many of them live without water, electricity, 
or an operating sewage system. Most problematic of all, the state of lawlessness was a constant 
endangerment to their lives, their communities, and their livelihood. All these problems led to 
mass exodus occurring in many parts of the conflict zone. Providing them with a safe passage, 
however, is easier in theory than in practice according to previous research (Weissman, 2004). 
Secondly, once they are out of the conflict zone, there is a question of how best to provide basic 
relief, the people who have fled their home towns having lost their home, possessions and 
livelihood, and therefore providing such relief is crucial (Weiss and Collins, 2000). Thirdly, 
there is the question of livelihood rebuilding, and in particular, how to ensure that their 
competencies can be best utilised in a related or even a different profession. Studies have 
suggested that this can be done through employment but also through self-employment, 
through skill and capacity building but also through the provision of microfinance (Banfield et 
al, 2006). Instead of offering goods and services as donations to the individuals, who are 
affected by warfare, offerings them a loan to start up an employment or a venture would provide 
sustainable solutions not only for the beneficiaries but also providing financial self-sufficiency 
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to the ventures that offer the loan. Microfinance is considered to be an alternative option for 
individuals with lack of resources to start up a venture (Newman, Schwarz, and Borgia, 2014) 
as it does not require physical collaterals to access  finances or loans, which is a crucial resource 
to start up and grow a venture. Therefore, through micro financing, SEVs can significantly 
contribute to solve the social problems as well as can be financially sustainable. 
 It is also important to note that the situation of warfare and its consequences has 
captured media attention worldwide, accompanied by widespread discussion on social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter in both Arabic and English. Scholars (Sacco and Bossio, 2015, 
p. 59) argue that ‘the dynamism of social media creates opportunities for fast news 
dissemination, pluralised voices in reportage, and extended audience reach’. The ruling regime 
faced condemnation from political leaders and other influential figures, initially for how the 
protest was being handled, and then the approach it took to suppress the subsequent unrest. At 
the grassroots level, netizens have expressed considerable anger both towards the regime and 
also about the lack of action taken by the UN. The emotional outpouring of grief and despair 
was collective, with well-wishers from across the world choosing different ways to support the 
situation. Some well-wishers support the cause through donations to international relief 
agencies that became actively involved, but many were unable to reach those in need due to 
logistical and safety concerns. Studies (Toole and Waldman, 1990) show that most of the 
international development agencies, although they have adequate resources and capabilities, 
still failed to provide necessary supports to internally displaced population. Consequently, the 
unmet needs of the displaced population still remain (Kim et al., 2007). Therefore, others who 
feel more strongly, in particularly netizens who came from the country of the conflict as well 
as those who migrated elsewhere, became involved through more active means, and our case 
was born out of such a desire amongst such a group. Converting these concerns into the creation 
of a sustainable socially entrepreneurial venture for the creation and delivery of socially 
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entrepreneurial actions providing sustainable solutions to the problems of those individuals 
who are affected and displaced by the war and conflicts. This is the area that this paper is 
intending to explore further.  
5 Methodology  
The research method that we adopted for this study is a single case analysis. The single case 
analysis has long been established in the literature as one of the research strategies (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). We followed closely the approach adopted by Lewis 
(2013), in a study that focused on a single social organisation in terms of how it emerged in the 
context of a natural disaster and evolved over time. We found considerable similarities between 
the context of the study and ours, particularly in the emergent context, its unpredictability, and 
the mass supports associated with it. Furthermore, our study is ‘revelatory’, as it aims to explore 
the creation and development of socially entrepreneurial venture in the context of war and 
conflict, for which scholars (Becker, 2012; Ghauri, 2004, p. 7) suggest that ‘a single case design 
is appropriate’. Therefore, we consider the approach adopted in this paper a fitting one to 
follow.  
Our research began after a chance encounter in a local entrepreneurship workshop 
between a researcher and one of the co-founders of the SEV that was operating in a war and 
conflict zone. Then, following the convenience sampling method (Etikan, Musa, and Alkassim 
2016), we selected the SEV as our single case and the co-founder as one of the interviewees in 
this research. Given the ongoing war and conflicts, resulting restrictions of the movement of 
people and their lack of security, in the country where the SEV was located, the adoption of 
convince sampling method is appropriate in this study. The cofounder of the SEV had left the 
country some time before. The researchers had a long initial discussion about the nature of the 
SEV and through the discussion and communications they developed trust to each other. This 
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person then acted as the focal point for accessing information, consistent with the approach 
adopted by Lewis (2013). As with Lewis (2013), the voice of the entrepreneur is the focal point 
of the study. The person also provided valuable secondary information to the researchers, 
including access to the group’s Facebook content. Indeed, If we had not adopted this approach, 
we wouldn’t have been able to obtain any information (Atkinson and Flint, 2001), given the 
context of war and conflicts in which ‘the entire population is marginalized to some degree, 
making it ‘hidden’ from and ‘hard to reach’ from the outside because the conflict develops 
distrust and suspension among the population, particularly, with the outsiders (Cohen and 
Arieli, 2011). The personnel we discussed with involved in the roles as co-founder, treasurer, 
outreach worker, and foreign member of the SEV. This allowed us to gain a complete picture 
of the SEV and it is consistent with a recent study of Bacq, Janssen, and Noël (2017). As the 
SEV remains in operation we anonymized data collection, cleaning and analysis stages to avoid 
potential ramifications, consistent with Kaiser (2009). Whilst Lewis (2013) did not anonymise 
the identities of the country, organisation, and interviewees, the different context that we faced 
(war and conflict) led us to omit the specific contexts in relation to the country and major 
locations of their operation. Instead, country-neutral pseudonyms that were chosen by one of 
the co-founders are used. These include Zaman (the name of the country), Moanabi (the capital 
that remains under the government’s control), Mimas, Salam, Nawaer and Jabal (provincial 
cities affected by the conflict). In addition, some of the factual information has also been 
moderately altered to protect the identity of the SEV and the people within it, without affecting 
the arguments in the study. Consistent with the prior similar, qualitative, case studies based, 
social entrepreneurship research (Bacq, Janssen, and Noël, 2017), the interviews were 
complemented by secondary information. These include internet searches of the stories in 
association with the SEV and its context including Facebook group contents, newspaper and 
magazine articles, other social media platforms, and the personal blogs of relevant personnel. 
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Furthermore, following the purposive sampling principle (Etikan, Musa, and Alkassim 
2016), we also conducted additional interviews with personnel who had expertise on the socio, 
economic, and political environment of the area and the country where the SEV was located 
and operated. The information obtained from them enabled us to triangulate (Suri, 2011) and 
then complement the date obtained from the SEV. Following the notion of information 
sufficiency (Saunders and Townsend, 2016, p., 837), we realised that the information obtained 
from interviewing those involving in roles representing and covering different areas of the 
SEV, additional experts as well as the data obtained from secondary sources was sufficient to 
achieve our research purpose.  
Two rounds of coding were adopted. First, a-priori codes (themes) were developed in 
accordance with Linder’s (2012) categorisation. Once responses were allocated to these general 
themes, sub-themes were then created in each category (Table 4). The main purpose of the 
adoption of Linder’s  (2012) model and categorisation in this study is to facilitate us to 
understand whether the creation and development of socially entrepreneurial ventures in 
resource-poor and unstable environment caused by war and conflicts follow the similar pattern 
to the creation and development of such ventures in stable environment. 
 
*** Insert Table 4 about here*** 
6 Findings 
6.1 Idea generation  
The SEV started when three friends used Facebook to discuss what they could do to help. All 
three are from the country concerned and, at the time, lived in that country. Two were from 
Montabi, the capital that remains under government control, and the other was originally from 
Mimas, a provincial city, which became the stronghold of the rebels and a main focal point of 
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the subsequent conflict. They considered a number of ideas for relief work and, after some 
discussion, eventually settled on a temporary rehoming scheme to allow the displaced persons 
to be housed in vacant properties across the country that were considered safe:  
When the conflict started in Mimas, people were starting to flee the city and going into 
cities that were safer, such as Motanbi. One issue that occurred to us was that these 
people needed shelter. Many of them were homeless, without anything. Some people 
in these cities began to lend out their spare houses. Some rich people may have three 
houses and they don’t use them, or only for rental.     
However, at the time this was only done on an ad-hoc basis and the distribution process was 
inefficient. Displaced persons who arrived from the conflict areas often had limited contacts 
with those willing to offer support. In addition, there was also hesitancy from the potential 
lenders as there were concerns as to whether they were legitimate refugees or simply 
opportunists. What occurred to the group members was that the process could be done more 
systematically and efficiently:     
We realised that we could gather information on the people who own these houses and 
the people who need these houses. We can keep a registry of it and do the matching, 
with no payment.  
The logical point to start the initiative was to operate between the cities where the co-founders 
were based, Mimas and Motanbi.  Once the venture was up and running they began to share 
their initiative with friends online and joined forces with them. The majority were students and 
expatriates from outside the country, living across the world. Eventually, with the mix of people 
within the group they settled to operate between three points: the two already mentioned, and 
Salam, a further provincial city that was under siege by government forces: 
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At the beginning of the conflict, support was pouring in for these people because they 
are from Zaman and they empathised with them.  We had people outside the country 
fund raising amongst the local communities in the country where they were based. As 
we received more funding and manpower as supports, we were trying to grow. In 
addition to the three cities mentioned, we also expanded into a fourth and fifth city that 
are considered safe places. People operating in these cities provided these new families 
not only with shelter, but also bedding, blankets, clothes, food baskets and other 
essentials. At the time, no NGOs had started operating in Zaman.  
6.2 Design and planning  
At the design and planning stage, a number of issues had to be considered, including the 
following:  
6.2.1 Platform selection  
The platform chosen was Facebook, the reason being that Facebook offers anonymity to 
members. The government became more suspicious of citizen involvement, especially if it 
involved people travelling out of the rebel-controlled areas. This led to tighter controls with 
many people being arrested. Concern for safety led to the choice of Facebook over other forms 
of social media such as Twitter:  
Protecting the identity of our participants is key. We decided to choose Facebook as 
our operation platform because of the closed group function, which enabled us to screen 
those who wished to join. Each of the original participants adopts a pseudonym 
Facebook profile and an email account specifically for working for the SEV.  
Facebook was used for a number of functions including news dissemination, idea discussion 
and providing a record. These include important financial and transaction documents. 
Newsfeeds only got deleted if they involved conflict between individuals, as it could cause 
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disharmony. For security reasons, they never put real personal information, phone numbers and 
other personal details online. Whilst the major part of the collaboration was conducted on 
Facebook and Skype, traditional email and phones were also in use.   
6.2.2 Member selection  
Initially the door was kept relatively open. One of the interviewees said that two of the friends 
just joined the Facebook group. Later as the conflict intensified, new membership was 
restricted to those who were already connected to the existing members, who then acted as the 
verifier of the person’s identity. One of the co-founders explained:  
There is a node. For instance, me. Then there are four people from my school, my 
undergrad, so they are real, sincere people I really know. I know they will not harm us 
and tell our secrets to outsiders. These four people, each one, is a node to another three 
or four people. So we started with three. I added a member who I think will be very 
helpful and safe and eventually we grew bigger and bigger. Therefore even if I don’t 
trust you, I trust your friend… The central co-ordinator verifies each of the pseudonym 
profiles requesting to join. The co-ordinator will ask the node, ‘Who is he? How did 
you know him? Do you know his house, his family? Where is he? Where did he study?’ 
We do not need his name, just that you know him. So if you think he can be trusted, 
then we will add him… There are many members whose real name I still don’t know… 
You cannot add someone who you or your close friends do not know personally.  
At the time of the interview there were 80-82 members within the SEV.  
6.2.3 Relationship with the government  
One of the decisions that they had to make was the relationship that they intended to have with 
the government. Most SEVs registered with the government were offered the legitimacy and 
freedom to operate within any government controlled territories, including those with restricted 
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access. Additionally, it allowed them to operate openly, and to have a legitimate presence both 
physically and online. Furthermore, it enhanced their marketing functions, increasing their 
ability to fundraise and to obtain resources through other means. The downside of government 
association, however, was that the government may want to interfere and direct the targeted 
recipients, focusing on their political supporters. At the same time, opposing forces may 
perceive the organisation as hostile to their cause and may equally hinder their work in the 
rebel controlled area. This provided them with a major dilemma at the formation stage. The 
decision was that the SEV should remain apolitical. Nevertheless, according to the co-founder:    
Although our organisation is apolitical, our members tend to lean towards the revolution 
side and share a strong resentment towards the government. Most felt uneasy working 
with the government, with many attributing the chaos and unrest to the way the 
government handled the situation. Some even participated actively in protests or even 
more. Therefore it would not be wise for our organisation to become registered with 
the government.   
It was a difficult decision for them because the SEV essentially functioned between the conflict 
zone and government controlled territories, but was one that had to be made for the safety of 
their members. Once this political line was drawn, it also affected their subsequent recruitment 
target, as they began to screen out government supporters and sympathisers. It has also affected 
their strategy towards their operation:  
The government knows about us, it’s not that they don’t know. But sometimes you walk 
clear of the boundary, then it is okay, but you shouldn’t do anything that threatens 
them…We deliberately keep low key and operate largely undercover. We also deliberately 
keep small because the bigger we are, the more attention we will draw from the 
government, which could endanger our operation.  
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6.2.3.1 Safeguarding mechanisms 
However, working without government registration presents a threat to the long term survival 
of the SEV. There have been incidents in the past where the government infiltrated similar 
operations, resulting in their leading figures being found and their operations closed down. 
Consequently, the SEV took a number of steps to tighten up their safeguarding procedures.  
During operations, a number of different codes and passwords were also used. Explaining the 
rationale: 
When we talk we have to use codes. I mean we can’t say ‘I have a family here and I 
really need a house’, because the government may intercept these things. Even if they 
discover that you are helping vulnerable families, they can take you and ask if you do 
that and a lot of other things. Because these families lived in a place that is against the 
government, and therefore helping them means you must be against the government, 
kind of. Therefore we should keep things secret.      
The SEV also had to confront the danger of infiltration, as explained below:   
In the first two years the government was catching lots and lots of people. Members 
may have been taken away by the government who then assumed an identity online. 
Normally their arrest is not about us, but their participations in political protests or other 
actions. They want to find out exactly who these people have been in contact with, and 
the activities that they have been involved in. Sometimes they would start by contacting 
other unsuspecting members, to find out who they are and what they are doing. 
Therefore if someone had been arrested then our online activities would eventually have 
been found out. Leaving them in would jeopardise the safety of the whole group and 
we cannot afford that.  
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To prevent this, the SEV always told their members to be vigilant, and never to trust online 
contacts without verification. When a conversation became suspicious, contact was cut off and 
the co-ordinator was told. A number of safeguarding procedures were put in place, as explained 
below:  
The co-ordinator is in possession of the log-in details of the pseudonym Facebook 
profile of each member. If they heard that a member had been arrested, then they would 
delete the account immediately. If a member had not been responsive for a while, they 
would try to contact them and, without response after trying both their real Facebook 
profile and phone, they would immediately take them out of the group for precautionary 
reasons.  
6.3 Delivery and execution  
6.3.1 Setting the delivery blueprint 
Although the SEV started with a re-homing initiative, they continued to experiment with a 
number of social projects. To do so they needed a dynamic set up that induces innovation and 
facilitates change. Additionally, they need to access to resources. Specifically, due to being in 
the host location, it is crucial for them to collaborate with local individuals to access to local 
resources, and with outsiders to access to advanced knowledge and competencies in order to 
successfully create social projects and deliver social values. A co-founder explained their 
approach in more detail and described a largely bottom-up decision structure in deciding on 
the projects to pursue:  
After about a year into the conflict, other NGOs and other organisations started helping 
too… We don’t want to compete. We want to identify market gaps so when other people 
start working on it, we moved on to other projects. Our projects keep changing as the 
composition of the people and situation changes. Everyone’s skills are utilised to create 
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new ideas. We rely a lot on the insiders for their local information and observations, 
and outsiders for their other knowledge and competencies. We go for multiple 
objectives at a time, and we circulate and discuss the ideas on Facebook. We go directly 
to the relevant members for each project - ‘Do you want to be part of this or not?’ -  and 
of course anyone else can express interest. The structure is flexible. Sometimes local 
ideas are implemented locally. Each member has their own projects. For instance, 
members in Germany are helping local members there. We go with the flow of the 
members. If no one is interested in an idea or have strong reasons against it, then we 
will move against it. We only make decisions on critical issues, or, when there are too 
many opinions, then the co-founders will make executive decisions.  
6.3.2 Workload distribution  
Alongside the co-founders who make executive decisions but otherwise take a low-key role, 
the main roles within the SEV include the co-ordinator, outreach workers and foreign members.   
Co-ordinator – The co-ordinator is one of the founders and the de-facto Chief Executive Officer 
within the SEV. The person is responsible for coordinating the transactions of money between 
local outreach workers on one hand, and foreign members on the other.   
Outreach workers – The outreach workers are responsible for most of the groundwork. They 
will be involved in the distribution of money as well as looking for people who need to be 
helped. They are also there to assess their needs, and decide on how best the SEV can offer 
support. They will also consider the eligibility of the recipients and make decisions 
accordingly. According to the person involved in outreach:  
I would say we were mostly working part time. For a day, if there is a serious issue it 
would take around three hours. But we are kind of working all of the time as at any time 
someone may have an issue or want something so we have to be available all the time… 
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at the beginning it was crazy. I was working eight hours, I was even working until 12am, 
typing online, even on the phone… I start typing a lot using internet all the time, I even 
had pains in my nerves. There are so many families sitting in the street without any 
houses. People will be calling, and say, there is a family of six, five kids, no man, so we 
need to put them somewhere.   
The outreach worker therefore plays a highly essential and substantive role in the SEV. The 
person has the discretionary power to make executive decisions once on the case. For instance, 
as the organisations began to expand, the challenge of the lack of housing began to emerge. It 
became the responsibility of the bottom-up initiatives by the outreach workers to source 
housing through different means. In one case:  
After two to three months of conflict, a lot of people came in as most of the houses are 
already full. We start renting houses and paying for the houses for these people, 
collecting the money through donations, some from inside Zaman and some outside 
Zaman.  
As the demand for housing was increasing rapidly but the resources (such as the houses that 
the local individuals were willing to offer them to temporarily shelter the displaced population) 
were very limited. In such a resource constraint situation, they need to utilise the resources that 
were at hands and the resources that were discarded or originally developed for other purposes 
in order to support the displaced people. In another case, they found innovative and cost-
effective way to obtain housing:   
The government closed down a lot of schools, but good things happened. 
Neighbourhoods started opening up these schools, and now every classroom has a 
family (living there).  
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Nevertheless, as people are beginning to settle, outreach workers are also responsible to deal 
with emerging challenges. For instance:   
All these people living in the same place means trouble. People will fight for money, 
food, a lot of bad things are going on so they need to organise them. So someone had 
to organise within these schools.  
Senior outreach workers also assume the role of local treasurer and therefore possess financial 
power over how the money is to be distributed and work very closely with the coordinator 
through social media.   
Foreign members – These are expatriates, students or displaced persons who are now based in 
a foreign country. Their main roles include raising donations, building awareness amongst the 
expatriate communities, and brainstorming in terms of organising new activities or strategies 
to get to newly needed locations. They are also responsible for connecting with other support 
bodies or relief organisations working in the country of conflict, as it is often easier to make 
connections once they are free from political intervention. These are mostly localised initiatives 
without top-down interference, since they are the income generation outlets. There will be a 
treasurer responsible for finance but money exchange can take place between foreign members 
and the co-ordinator directly.    
6.3.2.1 Rule setting and procedural issues  
At the beginning the organisation had no expectations regarding the kind of rules that would 
help improve the efficiency of the operation, or safeguard individuals’ interests, and 
consequently there were very few explicit rules. As time goes by, new rules begin to emerge 
to formalise practices. These are often triggered by ‘critical incidents’, when things have gone 
wrong. For instance, a co-founder recalled:  
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At the beginning we had an easy-going attitude towards collaboration. Members help 
each other in their own projects, two members say to each other, ‘I need some money 
for a family here’, and connect with each other without informing us as the managers. 
That had led to some financial transparency problems and arguments. Since then we 
(the co-founder and the co-ordinator) decided that we needed to control the money flow, 
and that we needed to be informed in case something happened. We don’t stop them, 
but we don’t encourage them to directly deal with each other.     
At other times these rules are introduced due to funding constraints. The outreach worker, for 
instance, who was in charge of the distribution of supports, recalled how eligibility rules have 
been set:    
We had limited funding and with the increased number we want to reach the vulnerable 
families first. I had to take the painful decision that families with men will not receive 
any support after  months into our programme. It was kind of cruel. It was a very hard 
decision for me personally as I was responsible for distributing the money and the 
families see me. I first gave them notice. I had to say to them that, look, you are a strong 
man, and you can feed your family, and you need to find a job. We tried to do it 
gradually so once they became more settled, we started reducing the support provided 
to make them feel that they need to get a job and be independent. Even for families with 
only women and children, we ask them to work. They can work from home.  
6.3.1.1 Financial organisation and management  
The co-ordinator takes a lead role in the financial organisation and management. All the money 
from the different fundraising activities will be channelled to the co-ordinator, who is based in 
a neighbouring Arab country that is not an ally of the ruling regime in Zaman. The money is 
then smuggled into Zaman, the rationale of which is explained below by an ex-Treasurer: 
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If you transfer money into Zaman, the one who received money will get a lot of 
questions from the government. Sometimes people will be jailed just for that. We have 
a secure method to bring the money into Zaman without being detected.  
Once in Zaman, the money is distributed to various local treasurers, who decide on how the 
money will be spent locally. The co-ordinator is also involved in bookkeeping, and keeps a 
record of all transactions that are being kept offline. Every week the co-ordinator will be in 
dialogue with both the foreign workers and local treasurers, usually through email. Details of 
all transactions between country treasurers and co-ordinators are uploaded onto Facebook to 
maintain transparency. There are always a few people working on the same project for 
monitoring and balance. Families who do not receive money any month can call the senior 
outreach worker to find out what has happened. They can also ask for a receipt. The co-founder 
admitted that it is always possible to abuse the system; it is felt that trust is the main issue.  
6.4 Monitoring and evaluation 
6.4.1 Reflecting on changes in the external context  
The SEV closely monitored how the external context has changed over time. From very early 
on the SEV realised that it cannot stand still, and needs to react to changes on a number of 
fronts. According to a co-founder: 
After about a year into the conflict, other NGOs and other organisations started helping 
(relief work) too. But our services also started changing by that point. We noticed that 
people need books, because the school year had started, the students start a new year in 
a new city, and their parents do not have money to pay. We collected second-hand 
textbooks which does not require a large budget… (then) we started with medicine. We 
then collected money to buy medicine and connect with those who are in possession of 
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medicine (hospital, pharmacy, doctors, etc). It is a similar project to the rehoming scheme 
where we connected people who need medicine and those who have medicine.  
6.4.2 Reflecting on changes in the internal context  
The SEV also bears in mind some of the internal structural issues within their existing projects. 
As the number of the beneficiaries increase, they began to realise that their current relief model 
was unsustainable. Support has decreased as the warfare continues and people begin to lose 
interest. They had to reduce the funding support for those who are less vulnerable as mentioned 
previously, but in doing so they realised the next challenge is to help them to become integrated 
into society, most importantly through employment. New initiatives begin to emerge tackling 
the integration and employment issues:  
After the initial three months period, families with men are moved on to the 
employment support scheme. We sit down with them to discuss what they would like 
to do, and push them to find a job. We help them to make connections with relevant 
people. But most importantly, some of them have been in the cities for nearly 2 years 
so they should make their own connection with their neighbours, and with work.  
Through doing so they also realised the importance of setting themselves up through financial 
support:   
We give them the money to start buying all the things they need in order to get a job.     
Whilst financial support for employment enables better integration, nevertheless, the SEV’s 
need for sustainability remains. They began to experiment with other models of support, such 
as collaboration with other partners, for example, with donors and funders. One of the models 
is through matching donors with families that are in need of employment support:  
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The donor specifies the amount that he has, whether it is a grant, a one-off loan, or a 
recycled loan, and the type of projects he wants the money to be spent on. He matches 
their funds with the most appropriate recipients, who will be given the money to carry 
out a specific employment project. Afterwards we report to the donor regularly about 
the progress that the recipient is making towards the project.   
The advantage of such a model is that the SEV is no longer required to bear all the costs in 
association with the support, and instead merely act as the middleman between the two. 
Another advantage is the financial transparency of this approach, as evidence of progress can 
be backed up by photographic evidence as well as the actual contact with the recipients. Donors 
feel engaged because they feel more involved when supporting an actual family rather than 
giving money to a cause where they have no idea where the money has been spent. Once they 
established that the demand for finance is high, the SEV began to experiment with other 
models, most notably microfinance. This has also proved popular amongst overseas donors. 
Since then they have received an increase in donations for support. This enabled them to make 
more loans, as well as bigger loans than previously.  
6.4.3 Reflecting on changes in the personnel context  
The number of members within Zaman continued to reduce due to conflict. Many of the people 
have left, and this has caused operational problems:   
We now only have ten people within Zaman and therefore finding people to do 
fieldwork is difficult. I was an outreach worker and it was extremely difficult to find a 
replacement. Before I left I had to spend three months to train one girl who was 
completely new. I had to meet all the families with her, as they would not trust new 
people. She is now also responsible for the local treasury.  
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The scope of groundwork activities that they can participate in has reduced considerably. In 
particular, they have now pulled out of operating in one of the original cities they operated in, 
because they do not have anyone living there anymore. Nevertheless, this was not considered 
to be a problem:  
We do as much as we can. The number of people that we were dealing with is 
decreasing anyway. People are kind of settled down. They are no longer living in the 
middle of a war, they live in a safe environment which is not 100% safe, but at least 
they have a home, they know where they will be the next day so they are not homeless.  
With the reduced groundwork involvement, the SEV is beginning to turn to the role of 
mediation between those who offer support and those who require support. As discussed above, 
the cases of medicine, second hand books and also loans for the poor are largely adopting this 
particular model.    
Many of the people who are now outside Zaman continue to be involved, but in different 
capacities. According to the person who used to involve as treasurer:    
The people who are now outside Zaman are now trying to fundraise, increase 
awareness, and take on advisory and supporting roles such as to design for the different 
campaigns. So we can do less in Zaman now, but the good thing is that they can now 
bring in more money.  
One emerging opportunity that they now notice is that these overseas members can now offer 
more extensive supports to new entrants to different countries. A person who operated as 
foreign member recalls:  
Many of our members who are overseas have good jobs and can offer advice to new 
entrants to the country that they are now based in. For instance, in a neighbouring Arab 
country, they advise them on how to find jobs, where to go to buy essential goods, and 
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places and scams to avoid to reduce danger. Many people had their money taken with 
the promise of a job that never materialised. For instance, locals may promise to give 
the refugees papers (work and residential documents) in exchange for money. Others 
in Germany, for instance, use our webpage as a forum to search for flats (to enable new 
entrants to settle). Some utilise their good language skills to translate relevant papers 
and articles from foreign sources. Some people who have obtained scholarships help 
others to obtain scholarships. They are a peer support group, not just helping outsiders 
but also each other. 
Another advantage is that, through the collaboration with foreign members, the SEV is being 
exposed to new ideas, techniques, and skills beyond what is available locally. The idea of 
turning towards the microfinance model, for instance, is the result of one of the co-founders, 
who, having left the country, by chance encountered the concept through a business idea-
pitching platform. Through the employment of the concept of microfinance, the SEV turned in 
self-sufficient socially entrepreneurial venture. Although they were already operating a micro-
loan scheme, the mentioning of the term ‘microfinance’ by one of the panel members opened 
the SEV up to a set of new literature and practices that they were not aware of in the first place. 
7 Discussions and conclusion 
Our case demonstrates the co-creation of one SEV and its journey in co-producing and co-
delivering social actions in a penurious and unstable conflict environment, eventually turning 
their efforts into a financially sustainable social venture. We believe that the contribution of 
the paper lies with a further understanding of the way in which SEVs can be co-created and the 
SEVs can co-create and co-produce social action, in a unique and restrictive conflict context, 
through utilising social media. Utilising the framework provided in Linders (2012), our study 
provides further understanding of the collaboration and interaction process between actors 
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within such a context. Our results demonstrate that the use of social media facilitates the SEV 
in each of the stages in the model of the social action lifecycle (Linders, 2012). Therefore, 
social media, as Flanagin et al. (2006) suggested, enabled the SEV to collapse time and reduce 
hierarchical restraints, allowing actors, in a more efficient and cost-effective way, to mobilise, 
co-create and co-produce social actions. Such advantages can be found in both the ‘design and 
planning’ and the ‘delivery and execution’ stages within Linders’ framework.  
We found that the experience of the SEV during the ‘monitoring and evaluation’ stage 
is consistent with other entrepreneurial firms in the literature (Baron, 2006), in that it is change 
orientated and able to quickly shift from one idea to the next in a highly entrepreneurial manner. 
Throughout the process they show that they are flexible, with new projects and initiatives 
emerging according to contextual changes. Additionally, we found that bricolage is the strategy 
the SEV employs to overcome the resource constraint conditions, which is consistent with the 
study of Di Domenico et al. (2010) on social enterprises in penurious environment. Our finding 
is also consistent with Segerberg and Bennett (2011) which suggests that social media 
facilitates a much more flexible approach to enable wider participation in the co-creation of 
new initiatives and projects over time. This enables the SEV to draw on both the local 
knowledge of the local workers, as well as the competencies, ideas and knowhow of members 
across the world. This enables the SEV to continuously innovate and adapt to changes and 
challenges. Highlighting the crucial roles of local knowledge in the operation and development 
of a venture, the findings of our study is in line with the study of Cheung and Kwong (2017) 
in the context of war and conflict. 
Compared to the empirical evidences found within the citizen co-production literature, 
we found that our SEV operated in a unique way, compared to their equivalents operating in 
penurious but stable environments, as well as those intending to pursue political action within 
the conflict situation (see Table 2). In our case, social media was not intended for mass-
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mobilisation, but for selected mobilisation amongst those within the network. This is due to the 
insecure environment and the fear of infiltration from opposing parties. Considerable efforts 
have also been made to protect those already within the network through the adoption of ritual 
and other subtle monitoring practices. 
*** Insert Table 5 about here*** 
Twitter is by default the popular choice of empirical study in the context of mobilising 
political action within conflict situations (Burns et al., 2013), and government platforms for 
C2C social action in a penurious but stable environment (O’Reilly, 2011). Our study 
demonstrates that in a context where government support is minimal, free social platforms such 
as Facebook emphasising exclusivity can be considered as a cost-effective alternative to the 
above. It offers a platform with essential operational functions to enable actors to discuss, 
manage and monitor in a manner similar to those on the government’s platform. Such a 
platform is important for social rather than political action because social actions require much 
more intensive, long term collaboration between a manageable number of actors and require 
articulation of the details in the execution. In contrast, political action emphasises information 
dissemination for mass mobilisation, often for a series of, but nevertheless, stand-alone events 
to generate a strong voice to be heard. We also found that, compared with Twitter, Facebook’s 
emphasis on exclusivity provides actors with a much more secure platform where social actions 
can be managed and the protests can be made by those involved, without serious political 
ramifications. By offering such insights about how contexts influence the creation, operation, 
and development of a socially entrepreneurial venture, this study significantly contributes to 
the entrepreneurship literature. Furthermore, entrepreneurship scholars have long been stating 
that there is a huge gap of qualitative research in the literature of entrepreneurship (Hindle, 
2004; Hlady-Rispal and Jouison-Laffitte, 2014), which this study contributes to fill. 
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In terms of our managerial contribution, our study highlights the possible ways in which 
social media can enable ‘volunteer citizens’ to get together in addressing pressing social issues 
in an unstable, ever-changing and politically sensitive environment. We helped identify 
challenges faced by these ‘volunteer citizens’ throughout the co-creation and co-delivery 
processes, and, through the example of our particular SEV, illustrate how overcoming these 
challenges may be possible through utilising a cost-effective social media platform such as 
Facebook. This would enable aspiring ‘volunteer citizens’ to learn from these challenges and 
think of how these can be overcome in their own specific context.  
In terms of future direction, it would be interesting to explore the challenges where 
access to social media is rare or restricted, where studies have suggested that netizens and 
activists operating within such environments tend to move very quickly between different 
social media platforms (Qiang, 2011; Sullivan 2011). It would be interesting to see whether 
organising SEVs such as the one identified in this study would still be possible.    
Our study also focuses on only one form of social media, Facebook, and it would be 
interesting to see how other social media platforms can be adapted for the process. As this 
study only considers the experience of one SEV, a quantitative study exploring the co-creation 
and co-delivery processes utilising an enriched sample size would enable the idea to be further 
generalised.  
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Table 1. Summary table of Linders (2012) 
Sequential Stages for co-
creation and co-production 
Roles of social media 
Design and planning  
(This stage involves the 
mobilisation of key actors to 
participate in the cause, work 
together and confirm the 
idea(s) to pursue and co-
create) 
1. To attract ethically, culturally, and physically diverse 
actors, 
2. To provide platforms to them to self-organize, and reduce 
co-ordination costs for doing so (Flanagin et al., 2006), 
3.To mobilize them efficiently and effectively to co-create, 
and 
4. To facilitate key actors to make strategic decisions. 
Delivery and execution 
(This stage covers the day-to-
day operation of the co-
delivery and co-production 
processes. These processes 
can take the form of a one-off 
transaction, or persistent 
collaboration and negotiation 
between actors towards the 
delivery and execution of 
socially entrepreneurial 
outcomes) 
1. To provides a platform in allowing for closer, deeper and 
more frequent collaboration between actors. Collaboratively 
developed obligations, expectations and sanctions can be 
sustained over time (Downing, 2005; Larson and Starr, 
1993) 
2. To allow each actor to offer particular knowledge and 
competencies that can enrich the process of co-delivery in an 
effective, efficient and sustainable manner (Banklers, 2006), 
3. To facilitate to manage the actors. 
Monitoring and evaluation 1. To facilitate to evaluate relevancy of actors and make 
changes in the social order by allowing the actors to leave 
48 
 
(This stage involves the 
evaluation of the current 
situation and the 
identification of issues and 
potential challenges such as 
operational deficiencies, as 
well as detecting and sensing 
changes within both the 
internal and external 
situational contexts) 
(who realize the organization is not relevant), the 
organization, by removing irrelevant actors from the 
network and/or by adding relevant actors into the network 
((Baron, 2006; Greve and Salaff, 2003). Social order within 
entrepreneurial organization is dynamic (Frank and Lueger, 
1997; Giddens, 2002; Johannisson, 1996). Such change can 
be seen as the adaptive element of the entrepreneurship 
process (Jack et al., 2008), with the changes in people 
dynamic in turn affecting the co-delivery of the path that the 
venture may embark upon (Downing, 2005; Granovetter, 
2000). Such changes could have the potential to rejuvenate 
and catapult the venture beyond the original contextual 
boundaries (Johannisson, 1988), enabling them to interact 
with the environment more efficiently (Johannisson and 
Monsted, 1997).  
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Table 2. Information about actors and activities in the social media and its challenges for 
the social media to overcome 
Information about actors Challenges for social media 
Identification 
(Name, personal background, 
skills, competencies and 
resources)  
1. Obtaining accuracy and authenticity of the 
information provided, 
2. Maintaining anonymity of the information.  
There is often the danger of infiltration by opposing 
bodies that may oppose the view shared by the group 
(Fearon, 2008) and hence it is crucial to know the 
actual identity of the actors so that the actors with 
opposing views could be removed from the network or 
the actors with the opposing views could be barred 
from joining the network to protect the whole group.  
Locational 
(Location of activities and its 
logistical details) 
1. Sensitive information requiring high level of 
anonymity. 
There is the question of sensitivity with the 
dissemination of information in relation to the location 
and the logistical arrangements of the actions proposed 
(Treverton and Miles, 2014). 
Tactical 
 (Explicit and implicit 
instructions regarding each 
person’s involvement, 
explaining the tasks that they 
1. Sensitivity, suitability, and enforceability. Without 
face-to-face contact it is hard to ensure that the person 
(actor) is suitable for the job and that their efforts can 
be monitored (Voida et al., 2012). 
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are expected to be involved 
in) 
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Table 3. Inclusivity versus exclusivity and network characteristics of Facebook and 
Twitter 
Particulars Facebook Twitter 
Inclusivity Low High 
Exclusivity High Low 
Network tie Strong Weak 
Network size Small Large 
Networks’ confidentiality High Low 
Note: This table is developed from Smith et al. (2012) and Sagerberg and Bennett (2011) 
  
Table 4. Coding details for this study  
Apriori codes (from Linders, 2012): 
x Design and planning 
x Delivery and execution 
x Monitor and evaluation  
Sub-themes developed from Linders 2012 
1.0. Idea generation  
2.0. Design and planning  
2.1.Choice of platform 
2.2. Choice of members/ volunteers 
2.3.Choice of the relationships with government  
2.4.Introducing safe guarding mechanism  
3.0.Delivery and execution  
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3.1.Setting blueprint  
3.2.Distributing workload  
3.3.Rule setting  
3.4.Procedures  
3.5.Financial organisation and financial management  
4.0.Monitoring and evaluation  
4.1.Reflect on external contextual changes 
4.2.Reflect on internal organisational changes  
4.3.Reflect on personnel changes  
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Table 5 Summary of findings in relation to the three types of co-creation and co-production of 
social actions   
 C2C co-production 
of SEVs in a 
penurious context  
Mobilisation of 
political action in a 
conflict-related 
context 
C2C co-production 
of SEVs in a 
conflict-related 
context  
Objective  
 
 
To support those 
who are affected by 
the particular goal 
the venture intends to 
pursue   
 
To reach the 
maximum number of 
people as possible 
 
To support those 
who are affected by 
the particular goal 
the venture intends to 
pursue   
 
Types of media 
platform used  
Facebook, Twitter, 
Governmental e-
platforms 
Mostly Twitter, but 
also on Facebook 
and other social 
media outlets  
 
Facebook only 
domestically, other 
media and social 
media outlets 
internationally  
  
Mobilisation of 
interest  
 
An open network 
intends to mobilise 
all, but mostly locals, 
who are affected by 
the particular goal 
An open network 
intends to mobilise 
all who are affected 
by the particular goal 
the venture intends to 
pursue. This includes 
A closed network 
intends to mobilise 
only those within the 
personal network of 
those involved. This 
includes people who 
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the venture intends to 
pursue.  
  
people who are both 
locally affected and 
those who are further 
away and wishing to 
support. 
 
are both locally 
affected and those 
who are further away 
and wishing to 
support.  
  
Design and 
planning 
 
Bottom-up co-
creation, sometimes 
being driven by 
government agendas. 
 
Opinions are shared 
and ideas are then 
being put forward by 
involved actors  
 
Bottom-up co-
creation  
 
Opinions are shared 
and ideas being put 
forward by involved 
actors 
Bottom-up co-
creation  
 
Opinions are shared 
and ideas being put 
forward by involved 
actors 
Delivery and 
execution 
  
Considerable 
challenges in relation 
to delivery 
execution, in 
particular, how 
volunteers are being 
managed. Local 
collective interest 
often becomes the 
Considerable 
challenges in relation 
to delivery and 
execution, including 
1) the need to avoid 
infiltration from 
opposing parties; 2) 
handling Slacktivists 
who vent their 
Challenges reduced 
by the pre-screened 
nature of the actors 
and that they are 
being motivated by 
shared collective 
interest  
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major motivation to 
participate.   
 
frustrations online 
but perform no 
physical action; 3) 
Physical danger also 
put off some 
activists.  
  
Monitoring and 
evaluation  
Monitor mostly 
internal efficiency 
rather than change in 
external context  
 
Cannot be controlled  Monitor both internal 
efficiency and 
external change in 
context  
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework of this study  
Choice of social media outlet (Smith et al., 2012)            Implementational Specificities (Linders, 
2012) 
 
 
Nature of information obtained under the selected social media 
(Lement, 1981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusivity versus exclusivity  
1. Identification information  
2. Locational information 
3. Tactical information  
1. Design and 
planning 
2. Delivery and 
execution 
3. Monitor and 
evaluation  
